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THE ORGANISATION OF CO-OPERATION
Prof. dr. M.R. van Gils
School for Management and Organization
LJniver'sity of Groningen, Holland

1.

Introduction

With pleasure 1 have accepted the invitation of your president Mr. Hamel to
give a contribution to the discussion on the topic 'library co-operation;
trends, possibilities and conditions ' . In this paper I will limit myself to
the more general aspects of coordination and cooperation, with the hope that
the framework I use will be a fruitful starting point for discussion.
The paper deals with the following questions:

4.

Why is interorganizational cooperation a problem?
What is interorganizational cooperation? What kind of structural configurations can be established? What are arguments for tight coupling between organizations and what are arguments for loose coupling?
What are the main barriers to Interorganizational cooperation?
What models can be used to promote interorganizational cooperation?

2.

Why is interorganizational coordination a problem

1.
'>
<-.

3.

Both in the private and public sector we find a growing concern for interorganizational coordination and cooperation. In the public sector for instance
policy-makers are confronted with the consequences of increased territorial
and functional differentiation and specialization. If we look at the health
care system in the Netherlands, or the welfare, or the educational system we
see a whole network of more or less independent organisations, each claiming
its own domain, each careful to protect its own ident.ity and each stressing
its own uniqueness. Vet, although we live in a world of organizations we
have tremendous difficulties in coordinating the activities of these organisations. and establishing the interrelationships necessary to obtain societal
goals. What we lack are the instruments (power, authority) for controlling
these interrelationships between organizations, and we more of ten than not
have to rely on the willingness of individual organizational members to
initiate efforts in the direction of interorganizational cooperation.
The increase in differentiation and specialization has produced systems in
which the problem solving capacity (dealing with technological innovation,
organizational and technical complexities, re-allocation of scarce resources)
of governments, central coordinating agencies or other institutions are disaggregated in a collection of subsystems with limited tasks, competences and
resources, and where the relatively independent participants possess different
bits of information, represent different interests and pursue separate, potentially conflicting courses of action. The problems we are confronted with
cut across the boundaries of separate authorities and functional jurisdictions.
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These oroblems are the more Dressina in a Deriod in which all Western industrial countries are confronted with an economic recession and therefore. a
shortaae in means to finance the comolex structures on which our societies
are build. We have to consider the necessitv of doinq awav with orqanizational inefficiencies. to reorqanize our comDlex svstems so that thev wi11 with
less costs at least maintain the same output. If we want to maintain our
highly deve10ped health care, welfare, educational and other systems we have
to rea1ize that we must find means to increase interorganization~ coordinatio~
to increase effectiveness and efficiency, as we can not any 10nger permit ourse1ves to allocate un1imited amounts of public money to these systems.
Is interorganizationa1 cooperation a major problem for the government, we can
also conclude that it is of growing concern for the private sector. Structural
overcapacity, growing costs and competition, complex and expensive technologies, the need for innovation, the efficient use of scarce resources, lead to
a growing awareness of the necessity of cooperation between organization to
achieve coordination. The task we are confronted wlth in a1most all sectors
of our society is 'redesigning complex networks of forma11y a~tonomous, but
interdependent organizations ' (Metcalfe, 1977). This requires extensive coordination, and redefining ro1es and re1ationships of the organizations involved in the network.
However the attempt to iniatiate interorganizationa1 cooperation proves to be
rather difficu1t. Organizations, more ofte~ than nog seem to be rather power1ess to iniatiate the necessary coordinating 1inkages. There of ten is an imcompatabi1ity between organizations due to the fact that organizations do not
share the same goals, have different e1ite-va1ues or do nog consider their
technologies and resource needs as comp1ementary. Even when there is compatibi1ity and comp1ementarity in 'objective ' terms, they exist nevertheless in
the perception of decisionmakers and these perceptions can create rea1
blockades.
All this brings us to our central question: what modes are there to ensure
coordinated po1icy actions of re1ative1y independent actors. For this we need
networks of separate but interdependent organizations where the co11ective
capabi1ities of a number of participants are essentia1 for effective prob1emsolving or where the activities of individua1 units can be guided by more
general po1icy considerations.
3.

The concepts of coordination and cooperation

With coordination we try to link the activit'i~es of relative1y independent
units to ach;eve a specific goal. The fo11owing mechanisms are most1y used
by organizations to coordinate their interna1 affairs: mutua1 adjustment,
direct supervision, standardization of work processes, standardization of
work outputs and standardization of workskiffs. The choice of a specific
mechanism depends on the comp1exity of the task to be done, the specific
characteristics of the task, the way tasks are re1ated to one another, the
felt need for organizationa1 f1exibility etc. One can say there isa certain
amount of 'organizational choice ' in se1ecting.the most appropiate coordination mechanisms. As coordination aims at contro11ing the behavior of human
actors, the '1evers ' for such control are power and influence.
With the term coorpation we describe the joint action of two or more parties
for mutua1 benefit. Cooperation invo1ves coordination. Cooperation is in its
essence a vo1untary act by parties involved. When interorganizationa1 coordination becomes more and more important the wi11ingness to cooperate becomes
a necessary condition. The choice of a coordinative mechanism in a coopera~
tive situation depends on the amount of power and inf1uence that can be used
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by the parties involved. Tn some situations coordination can be ensured by
'coercion'. The 'coerced' party has no option but to meet the preferences
of the coercing party or bear some sanction imposed by that party. As coercion is in our society (fortunately) a not toD preferred instrument to achieve
coo t'dination, we will have to rely on forms of cooperation. In the field of
interorganizational decision-making this is not an easy task as there is not
an overall authority structure to resolve conflicts. Interorganizational coopera tion thet'eforedepends very of ten on the outcome of multilateral bar']aining between the representatives of orqanizations involved. Coooerat ion
liever the less deoends on the caoacitv and willingness of organizations to
solve problems that meet the different needs of various groups. Some pessimists
in our society, and may be they are right, seriously doubt our capacity for
developing these joint courses of action and fear that bureaucratic and
centralized hierarchic control (and therefor coercion) are the only means that
will work to ensure coordination.
Coordination networks (hhetiler voluntary or coercive of nature) can differ in
intensity of the interrelationships and in the kind of structure to be developed. The choice of a specific type of network depends on questions like:
- the price (loss of autonomy) organizations are willing to pay for coordinatinq their efforts;
- the amount of cooperation actors need to realize their aims;
- the felt need for cooperation;
- the amount of power and influence of the actars in the network.
The following major structural forms in interorganizational networks can be
distinguished.

A.

Horizontal structure: There is nog hierarchical relationship between the
participating organizations, although there can be
differences in power potential. There is no centra l
coordinating agency. Parties agree to for instance
share information, coordinate their efforts etc.
but each actor more or less remains autonomous.

S.

Central coordinating Agency. If the horizontal structure is in itself in-
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agree to create within the existing horizontal
structure to establish a central coordinating agency

Central coordinating agency with hierarchical authority. The participating organizations make themselves subordinate to a
central agency with hierarch~cal power . In fact a
hierarchical level is create! and actors have deleqated
some of their power to this aqency.
',&.

•

~/:T \

With these thre8 forms (If co0rdination we have moved from a level of looselv
coupled (horizontal) orqanizations to one in which there are strong vertical
ties, to one from more or less voluntary relations to one with a high specificity of
guidelines and in which a tight coupling of organizations has
taken place.
There are in the field of interorganizational decisionmaking and cooperation
proponents for tight and proponents for loose coupling 0f organizations.
Those that favor tight coupling state that hierarchica1 control must be used
to negate the tendencies of organizations to pursue narrow, and sectarian interesta. Output~ that berefit the eni.ire population se veu dre only possible
in structures Wf' ere speeal interest::> are held tightly 'lr, ·~ heck.
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Arguments in favor of tight coupling refer for instanee to(és. Aldrich, 1977):
- The indivisibility of problems. Some problems cannot be broken down into
seperate pieces and if different oraanizations work on the oroblem from
their own oersoective one aets a series of oartia1 solutions. Examo1es are
pollution control , the coordination of economic deve10pment activities
between government, management and unions.
Organizational autonomv and seperate authoritv are barriers to effective
prob1em solution. Some observers arque that the existence of autonomous
orqanizations and proqrams. each with itw own protected boundaries. not
on1v fraqments prob1ems but a1so creates unsusmountab1e obstac1es to coordination. Vested and parochia1 interests, the defense of domains prec1ude
effective coordination.
Normal interorganizationa1 transactions are focussed on organizationa1
needs, not on the common welfare. This argument stresses that norma1 interorganizationa1 transactions are on too 10w a level and are too issue specific to achieve coordination among organizations at the population level,
even when they are ostensib1y dea1ing with the same general problem.
Large, dominant organizations benefit the most from loose coupling. In this
argument it is argued that in the absence of authoritative, comprehensive,
and p1anned coordination, the flow of resources in a system will benefit
the all-ready wellof organizations.
There are of course a1so various arguments that favor loose coupling:
Minimizing the degree of coupling allows for maximum responsiveness, innovation and adaptation to the 10ca1 invironment. Here it is argued that a
decentralized structure makes decision makers visible and accessible, thus
promoting pub1ic accountability. That decentra1ization stimulates feedback
and mutual adjustment.
In general one can say that a loosely coupled structure is most appropriate
under cnnditions where the environment is heterogeneous, decisions must be
made r ·' idly and a high degree of responsiveness to demands is required.
- Dup1ication and overlap of organizationa1 domains make some positive contribution in an interorganizationa1 system.
Here the importance of redundancy is stated. In uncertain environments redundancy can increase the probabilityof accomplishing tasks.
A last argument sometimes used infavor of loose coup1ing is that tight
coupling and high centrality may mean a 10ss of the benefits of division
of labor and specialization.
4.

Some potential barriersto cooperation

Organizations or organizational decisionmakers are typica11y oriented to the
acquisition and defense of an adequate supply of resources. Two basic types
of resources are central: the necessity of money to acquire scarce resources
and authority. Authority refers to the legitimation of activities, the right
and responsibi1ity to carryout programs of a certain kind. We call these
claim 'domains ' . The possession of a domain permits the organization (or a
profession) to operate in a certain sphere, claim support for its activities
and define proper practices within its realm.
On the basis of this we can hypothesize that if cooperation poses a threat to
the autonomy andjor the identity of the organizations they will be reluctant
to cooperate. Integration into a network will be considered as highly problematic and threatening unless organizations are assured that their overall
autonomy will not be hampered or that any autonomy which they would be required to surrender would yield compensatory returns.
A second hypothesis is that if there is a lack of domain consensus between
18

ot'gani zations. or' if organizations have no positive evaluation of each other,
or if they disagree along ideological lines or if coordination threatens the
maintendnce of order and effeetiveness in the established programms of an
ot'g anization, this is likely to preclude cooperation. Congruent expectations
ca n be viewed as a prerequisite for cooperation.
A third hypothesis is that if there are conflicting requirements for integration in systems in which an organization has multiple memberships this will
hinder collaboration with each system.
University libraries probably are members of more than one system and th i s
frequently results in the library organization receiving conflicting deman ds.
It has to participate in the overall network of library organizations and i n
the vertical programms of the university to which it belongs. This very of te
can lead to forms of conflict.
One might argue that organizations are willing to enter into cooperative relationships when
a. there is a felt need for cooperation due to environmental eireumstances ;
b. if the benefits of cooperation are clearly visible and
e. if the organization feels rather secure and has a strong power posit i on
in the network, so that it can bargain for results that are benefic i al
to the org~nization.
Vet even if conditions for eoncerted decision making and cooperative behavio r
are supportive, organizations quite of ten show a considerable amount of behavior which is not directed towards either problem sol ving or bargaining
over respective preferences but which is clearly devoted to defeating th e
proeess and to making the outcome as ambiquous and innocuous as possible.
Even if there a high integrative pay off to the participating organizati on s
emoti onal factors ean be so dominant that organizations prefer some kind of
avoidance behavior and stay oriènted to the existing status quo .
One can speculate about the motives behind this avoidance behavior. Reaso ns
of ten are:
- Fear for identity loss and loss of autonomy;
Fear for bureaucratie procedures;
A feeling that efforts to eooperation will eventually not succed at all.
and that it is a loss of time;
Fea r that eooperative efforts increase the visibility of an organizat ion
and therefore increase the organisation's vulnerabilities to attaek and
criti ci sm.
5.

An action model to promote interorganizational eooperation

To establish interorganizational cooperation is a difficult and in genera l
time consuming process. The proeess is therefor so difficult as tha partici pants have partly shared and partly eonflicting views and objeetives. They
also bring into this process different policies, attitudes and beliefs , bas ed
on differences in culture, history and direct experiences. One can notice
although network cooperation aims at problem solving, that bargaining between the participants is a rather common fenomenom .
Designing a suecesful network for interorganizational cooperation necessi tates therefore the development of a frame of reference that organizations
can share and the creation of mechanisms that preserves cooperation but a1so
deal with conflict maintenance.
The question is to what extent are l'epresentatives of organizations invol ved
in designing sueh a proeess able to handle all these eonstraints. If there
is a distinct attitude towards problemsolving, if there are not too many
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conflicting interests and if their is enough mutual trust and support
designing such a process might not be so difficult. If the conditions however are more difficult it might be worthwhile to work with a neutral outsider who has the respect and support of all parties involved.
This neutral outsider should but emphasis on designing the process. Substantive or structural recommendations are less important here then process reco~nendations. The outsider will in general not be asked for his expertise
with t'egards to the substantive content of the problems at stake, as this
expertise is already available within the organizations themselves. The main
task of the outsider is to facilitate the process of interorganizational
leaning.
The outsider should be aware of the bargaining elements that creep into the
situation, of the fact that a win - loose situation can develop, of the strategies and tactics parties use to influence the situation or to avoid that
decisions are made but which at the same time can create conflicts. In short
he should be aware that the design of a process for interorganizational cooperation is in essence a political decision making process.
The task of the outsider is to establish conditions which can lead to the development of the network. An effective instrument can be to start with a
working party that can be regarded as a replicate of the interorganizational
network. This microcosm models the large-scale political forces and provides
a mechanism for exploing the interconnections among problems and collectively
thinking through ways of dealing with them (cf. Metcalfe, 1977J.
The working party should deal with concrete issues on the basis of papers prepared for the discussions. The detailed analysis of these concrete problems
within a specific time period helps to bring down stereotypes, to build interpersonal contacts and to recognize the structural conflicts that have to
be resolved. The legitimacy of each other's claims can sa be recognized and
the problems of each organiztion better understood. Here the assistance of
the outsider can be helpful in creating a frame of reference the organizations
can share, and enabling them to recognize the areas in which coordination of
activities can be achieved. It is important that the consultant as a neutral
outsider keeps in close contact with the organizations represented in the
working party, as this keeps him informed of the relevanee of the recommendations made and their political feasability.
In this short paper same issues relevant for interorqanization cooperation
are dealt with. It is argued that in our society it is a problem of growing
concern, but at the same time a difficult political process. The action model
is not the panacee
for solving all the problems of d signing the
process of i nterorgani zati ona 1 cooperation, but a way to cre'a te conditi ons
suitable for such a process.
DISCUSSION
Mr. S. Westberg: lagree from my own experience that one of the best ways of achieving
cooperation is by starting to try to work together on specific problems. This does
produce practical results.
Dr. P.J.C.A. Pinxter: When you are trying to cooperate, it always seems difficult to ta lk
about real concrete questions with other people. Instead, all sorts of emotional aspects
come into play. 1 am always surprised at how we cannot talk about problems openly ;
instead, we get avoiding actions.
van Gils: Yes, people do not behave simply ra tionéllly, but also emotionally. If you are
from a large organization, you feel secure and can afford to be open, but in a smal!
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organ izatio n there is fear that you may suffer from the result
s, and this gives rise to
defens ive attitu des. Coope ration takes a long time to achiev e.
Mr. M.B. Line: Dr. Johnso n referr ed to a man's secon d marria
ge as "the triump h of love
over exper ience" . There is a great urge towar ds coope ration
, whieh is rather like
marria ge with more people involv ed, but in practi ee proble ms
arise, partly becau se the
practi eal benef its have not been fuUy calcul ated or empha sized,
and the costs turn out to
be greate r than antici pated .
van Gils: Coope ration is likely to be most succes sful if it is
forced on organ izatio ns, for
examp le by gover nment s, in respon se to econo mie condit ions
(force d marria ges). The
bodies conce rned have to learn to live with one anoth er.
Prof. A.J. Evans : There is a confli ct in the autono my of univer
sities in develo ping new
subjec ts or contin uing uneco nomie (that is smaU) depar tment
s, which in terms of librar y
provis ion are relativ ely very expen sive. Althou gh the
financ e comes from the
gover nment and some measu re of con trol exists , we still retain
our acade mie freedo m
within the univer sities and the library almos t inevit ably has
to follow the unive rsity
policy .
Mr. A.C. Bubb: Is there not a confli ct betwe en the profes
sional need to build up an
indepe ndent opera tion and the loss of person al autho rity implie
d by coope ration ?
van Gils: I fuUy agree with you there. There is often ten sion
betwe en the profes sional
outloo k on work organ izatio n and the needs of the client .
Wh en money is scarce , this
result s in increa sed confli ct.
Mr. P. Durey : Profes sor van Gils, you menti oned the confli
ct whieh can arise, when
consid ering a coope rative ventu re, in disting uishin g betwe
en the intere sts of an
indivi dual institu tion and those of a wider sphere . Is it prope r
to take the view that, since
one is emplo yed by a partic ular institu tion, the intere sts
of that institu tion should
preva il?
van Gils: You alway s have to make choiee s. If institu tions do
not establ ish horizo ntal ties
we shaU never get anywh ere, and it is our person al respon sibili
ty to develo p these links.
Confl icting links provid e a contin uous dilem ma in whieh we
oursel ves are of ten quite
power less.
Dr. D. Shaw: There seem to be three possib le struct ures for organ
izatio nal contro l, viz:
the benev olent dietat orship
the ful1y demo cratie system with equal voting rights
(HO
a mixed system whieh is an attem pt to recon cile the best eleme
nts of (i) and (ii).
(i)
(ii)

van Gils: I am not quite in favour of the one man - one vote
system , becau se the kind of
proble ms we are faced with is not easily solved in this way.
I believ e in the need for
centra lizatio n of autho rity, which enable s decisi ons to be made
and imple mente d, but a
dietat orship has also many disadv antage s, such as lack of flexib
ility. 1 am a lookin g for a
middl e of the way solutio n - as in (Hn.
Mr. G.A. Hame l: Can you give us adviee as to how one can
educa te profes sional s to
becom e more open to coope ration ?
van Gils: One of the first eleme nts is, "Is there a real need
for coope ration , and is this
need feIt?" If there is a need, what are the issues that are
releva nt and concr ete? Be
carefu l to study the bene fits and losses . Try to avoid emoti onal
barrie rs, and be aware of
the emoti onal aspec ts involv ed.
Mr. T.J. Tanze r: I would like to have your opmlOn on how
to try to deper sonali ze
proble ms and avoid the defen se of person al points of view.
van Gils: I think you can depers onaliz e proble ms by paying attent
ion to the proble m itself
- be object ive. This is, of course , diffie ult to achiev e in practi
ce.
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